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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

X

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

:

Case No.

:

Category No. 13

v.
PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY,

Defendant-Respondent. :
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole question presented for review is whether the
court of appeals erroneously reversed defendant's convictions on
the ground that the trial court abused its discretion because it
did not conduct an adequate inquiry of a prospective juror who
had been a victim of a crime similar to that with which defendant
was charged.
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' amended opinion was issued on
April 10, 1991, and appears in State v. Woollev, 158 Utah Adv.
Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (a copy of the opinion is contained
in the addendum).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes or rules pertinent to the question presented for review
is contained in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Paul Edwin Woolley, was charged with two
counts of forgery, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-501 (Supp. 1989) (R. 8-10).

After a jury trial, he was

convicted on both counts (R. 44, 72-73).

The trial court

sentenced him to two concurrent terms of zero to five years in
the Utah State Prison (R. 125-26).
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

That court, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the convictions

on the ground that the trial court had abused its discretion in
conducting jury voir dire because it had not adequately
investigated the potential bias of a prospective juror who had
been a victim of a crime similar to that with which defendant was
charged.

State v. Woolley, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35-41.
The pertinent facts are set forth in the court of

appeals' majority opinion:
During voir dire of potential jurors in
defendant's trial, the court, at the request
of defendant's counsel, asked: "Are there
those among you . . . , members of the panel,
who have yourselves been the victim of a
forgery or a crime involving deception or
fraud?" Three potential jurors, Mark Hoyt,
Chris VanLeeuwen, and James Tyler, responded
affirmatively. Hoyt explained that his
wallet was taken when he was in California
and that his credit card was used.
VanLeeuwen related that when he was in
2

Brazil, a thief stole his wallet and wrote
about $5,000 worth of checks on his account.
Similarly, Tyler explained that some of the
checks were stolen in 1961 when he lived in
Los Angeles and that someone had forged his
signature on some of those checks.
Following these responses, the trial court
asked Hoyt, VanLeeuwen, and Tyler, as a
group, one general follow-up question:
Those three of you who have
responded, recognizing that this
is a different time and place and
circumstance, would that experience,
having been the victim of that type
of a crime, affect your ability to
be fair and impartial in this case,
that is, would you be unable to set
aside that experience and hear the
evidence in this case and rule on
the evidence based upon what you
hear and the credibility of the
witnesses? If you would not be
able to do so, I want you to raise
your hand.
None of those questioned raised his hand.
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial
court requested counsel to pass the jury for
cause. The defense refused and requested a
sidebar conference. During the conference,
defense counsel asked the court to remove
Hoyt, Tyler, and VanLeeuwen because of their
admissions to having been victims of similar
crimes. The trial judge initially struck all
three of the challenged jurors for cause.
Subsequently, however, the court reinstated
juror VanLeeuwen, explaining its action by
stating that VanLeeuwen need not be removed
because the forgery occurred in a foreign
country. Defense counsel objected to the
reinstatement of VanLeeuwen and subsequently
removed VanLeeuwen by peremptory challenge.
158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35-36 (footnote omitted).

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO REVIEW
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY OF A PROSPECTIVE
JUROR WHO HAD BEEN A VICTIM OF A CRIME
SIMILAR TO THAT WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS
CHARGED.
The majority of the court of appeals concluded that the
trial court abused its discretion because it did not conduct an
adequate inquiry of a potential juror, Chris VanLeeuwen, who had
been a victim of a crime similar to that with which defendant was
charged.

It specifically held that "a potential juror's prior

victimization of the same crime for which the defendant is on
trial raises an inference

[of bias] such that the trial judge

must probe the juror to insure that he or she can decide the case
impartially despite the past victimization."
Adv. Rep. at 37 (emphasis added).

Woolley, 158 Utah

The majority determined that

the trial court did not conduct sufficient investigation of
potential bias when, after receiving affirmative responses from
VanLeeuwen and two other prospective jurors to its question
concerning prior victimization of a similar crime, it asked the
single follow-up question concerning the jurors' ability to be
impartial in light of their prior victimization.

Id., at 39.

"When comments are made which facially question a
prospective juror's partiality or prejudice, an abuse of
discretion may occur unless the challenged juror is removed by
the court or counsel investigates and finds the inference
4

rebutted."

State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989)

(citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988)).

The

narrow question presented to the court of appeals in the instant
case, and which caused the split in the panel, is whether a
juror's prior victimization of a crime similar to that with which
the defendant is charged raises an inference

of bias, such that

the more detailed investigation required under the Cobb principle
must be pursued by the trial court.

The majority of the court of

appeals panel held that it did, and that the trial court's
general, follow-up question concerning the jurors' ability to
consider impartially defendant's case in light of the prior
victimization did not constitute the probing inquiry contemplated
under Cobb.

Without discussing the significance of the

information the trial court had received about the circumstances
of each juror's prior victimization1, the majority criticized
the lower court for posing the follow-up question "only to the
group of prospective jurors who had been victims of similar
crimes without probing each individual juror separately to
determine the effect of the experience on the particular juror."
1

In its fact statement, the majority noted:
Hoyt explained that his wallet was taken when
he was in California and that his credit card
was used. VanLeeuwen related that when he
was in Brazil, a thief stole his wallet and
wrote about $5,000 worth of checks on his
account. Similarly, Tyler explained that
some of his checks were stolen in 1961 when
he lived in Los Angeles and that someone had
forged his signature on some of those checks.

158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35-36.
5

158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39.

In short, "[t]here was never a

personalized dialogue which would have given VanLeeuwen a chance
to express his latent feelings." Ibid.
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that simply
because a prospective juror has been the victim of a similar
crime does not raise an inference of bias, and that the
majority's holding therefore erroneously "requires prospective
jurors to be rehabilitated before any inference of bias has even
been established."

JTci. at 44-45 (Bench, J., dissenting).

This Court has not addressed this issue. Therefore,
the court of appeals' holding represents a decision on an
important question of law which has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court.

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).

It is not clear

that the pertinent decisions of this Court would require inquiry
beyond that pursued here by the trial court when a prospective
juror indicates that he or she has been a victim of a crime
similar to that with which the defendant is charged.

££.. State

v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (prior victims of crime
expressed strong feelings of anger and frustration about their
victimization and thus should have been excused for cause).
Accordingly, the Court should grant certiorari and review the
court of appeals' decision.

6

POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO REVIEW
THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THIS
COURT CONSIDERED AND REJECTED THE HOLDING OF
ROSS V. OKLAHOMA, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), THAT
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
REMOVE A PROSPECTIVE JUROR FOR CAUSE, THAT
FAILURE DID NOT ABRIDGE THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL JURY, SINCE THE JUROR DID NOT SIT,
HAVING BEEN REMOVED BY A DEFENSE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE.
In the court of appeals, the State argued in the
alternative that even if the trial court erred in failing to
remove VanLeeuwen for cause, defendant was not entitled to a
reversal because VanLeeuwen did not sit as a juror, having been
removed by a defense peremptory challenge, and there was no
showing that the jury that actually sat was not impartial.

The

State relied on Ross v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 81 (1988), which held
that although the trial court erred in failing to remove a
prospective juror for cause, that failure did not abridge the
defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to an impartial
jury, since the challenged juror did not sit on the jury, the
defendant's peremptory challenge having removed him as
effectively as if the trial court had done so.

The majority of

the court of appeals rejected this argument, explaining:
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian
after Ross was decided. We assume that the
court considered Ross when deciding Gotschall
and Julian, but chose to stay with its longstanding rule that M[a] court commits
prejudicial error if it forces a party to
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a
prospective juror who should have been
removed for cause." Gotschall, 782 P.2d at
7

461; see also Julian, 771 P.2d at 1064 n.ll.
Accordingly, we assume this is still the law
in Utah.
Woollev, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 n.5.
The basic flaw in the majority's rejection of Ross is
that this Court never even mentioned Ross in either State v.
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), or State v. Julian, 771 P.2d
1061 (Utah 1989).

The Court did not consider or reject Ross in

either of those cases, and it is not clear how the automatic
reversal error rule noted in Gotschall and followed in numerous
decisions of this Court, see, e.g., State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22,
25-27 (Utah 1984), insofar as it may be constitutionally based,
would be affected by Ross.

Therefore, in rejecting Ross, the

court of appeals has decided an important question of law which
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.
P. 46(d),

Utah R. App.

Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari to

review the decision of the court of appeals.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /rf^day

of June, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

~7&<unjL 2*, ^3k^
DAVID B. THOMPSON
(J
Assistant Attorney General
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158 Utah Adv. Rep. 35

ings suit against the tortfeasor] by deceit, non disclosure, reneging on promises, violation of industry
custom and deliberate attempts to obfuscate." Id. at
577.
Finally, we are not persuaded that the analysis of
the Arizona court is consistent with Beck. Cf. Hettwer
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 118 Idaho
373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990) (refusing to adopt Rawlings
approach when reviewing dismissal of third-party
bad faith claims of party insured by same insurance
company as tortfeasor because Rawlings involved
imposition of a tort-based duty in a first-party
situation).

Cite as

158 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Paul Edwin WOOLLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 900012-CA
FILED: April 10, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
ATTORNEYS:
Charles F. Loyd, Jr. and Joan C. Watt, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and
Greenwood.
AMENDED OPINION*
Billings, Judge:
Defendant Paul Edwin Woolley appeals
from his conviction of two counts of forgery,
a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1989). Defendant
claims the trial court committed reversible
error by failing either to remove a juror for
cause or to ask questions to probe his potential bias when the juror admitted he had been
a victim of forgery. We reverse and remand
for a new trial.
FACTS
During voir dire of potential jurors in defendant's trial, the court, at the request of
defendant's counsel, asked: ''Are there those
among you ... , members of the panel, who
have yourselves been the victim of a forgery or
a crime involving deception or fraud?" Three
potential jurors, Mark Hoyt, Chris VanLeeuwen, and James Tyler, responded affirmatively. Hoyt explained that his wallet was taken

„
30

State v7 vooiiey
158 Utah A v. Rep. 35

when he was in California and that his credit
card was used. VanLeeuwen related that when
he was in Brazil, a thief stole his wallet and
wrote about $5,000 worth of checks on his
account. Similarly, Tyler explained that some
of his checks were stolen in 1961 when he
lived in Los Angeles and that someone had
forged his signature on some of those checks.
. Following these responses, the trial court
asked Hoyt, VanLeeuwen, and Tyler, as a
group, one general follow-up question:
Those three of you who have responded, recognizing that this is a
different time and place and circumstance, would that experience,
having been the victim of that type
of a crime, affect your ability to be
fair and impartial in this case, that
is, would you be unable to set aside
that experience and hear the evidence in this case and rule on the
evidence based upon what you hear
and the credibility of the witnesses?
If you would not be able to do so, I
want you to raise your hand.
None of those questioned raised his hand.
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial
court requested counsel to pass the jury for
cause. The defense refused and requested a
sidebar conference. During the conference,
defense counsel asked the court to remove
Hoyt, Tyler, and VanLeeuwen because of their
admissions to having been victims of similar
crimes. The trial judge initially struck all three
of the challenged jurors for cause.1 Subsequently, however, the court reinstated juror
VanLeeuwen, explaining its action by stating
that VanLeeuwen need not be removed
because the forgery occurred in a foreign
country. Defense counsel objected to the reinstatement of VanLeeuwen and subsequently
removed VanLeeuwen by peremptory challenge.
Defendant was convicted on both counts of
forgery and was sentenced to two concurrent
terms of zero to five years. Defendant argues
on appeal that the court committed reversible
error in reinstating VanLeeuwen.

CODE • co
Provo, Utah

another.* Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533.
536 (Utah 1981).*
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently
emphasized that "it is [the trial judge's] duty
to see that the constitutional right of .an
accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded,"
State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319-20 (Utah
1977), and has reversed criminal convictions
based solely on the appearance that such right
may have been jeopardized.4 Accordingly, trial
courts must adequately probe a juror's potential bias when that juror's responses or other
facts suggest a bias. The court's discretion is
properly exercised when deciding whether to
dismiss a juror for cause only after this investigation takes place.
A party is entitled to use peremptory challenges to remove jurors who are not properly
removed for cause. State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d
878, 883 (Utah 1981) ("Brooks II"); State v.
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Utah 1977)
("Brooks J"); Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d
1091, 1093 (Utah 1975). It is prejudicial error
to compel a party to exercise a peremptory
challenge to remove a prospective juror who
should have been removed for cause. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; Stare v. Julian, 111
P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1989).*
A. Juror Impartiality
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury.
See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah
1988). Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)
implements these constitutional mandates and
offers guidance as to when a juror should be
removed for cause. This rule provides in relevant part:
The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may
be taken on one or more of the
following grounds:

(14) That a state of mind exists on
the part of the juror with reference
to the cause, or to either parly,
which will prevent him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to
REMOVAL OF A JUROR FOR CAUSE
the substantial rights of the party
A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for
challenging....
cause is within the sound discretion of the trial
Utah
R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14).
court. When reviewing such a ruling, we
Juror impartiality is a "mental attitude of
reverse only if the trial court has abused its
discretion. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, appropriate indifference." Bishop, 753 P.2d at
462 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Larson, 775 451 (citing Brooks I, 563 P.2d at 801). "Chief
P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 Justice Marshall, presiding over the trial of
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)).* The Utah Aaron Burr in 1807, defined an impartial jury
Supreme Court has noted, however, that the as one composed of persons who 'will fairly
exercise of the trial court's discretion in sele- hear the testimony which may be offered to
cting a fair and impartial jury must be viewed them, and bring in their verdict, according to
"in light of the fact that it is a simple matter that testimony, and according to the law
to obviate any problem of bias simply by arising on it.'" Srare v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765,
excusing the prospective juror and selecting 767 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted).
UTAH ADV NCE REPORTS
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In assessing whether a juror should be
removed for cause, the supreme court has
given the following guidance:
Light impressions which may fairly
be supposed to yield to the testimony that may be offered; which
may leave the mind open to a fair
consideration of that testimony,
constitute no sufficient objection to
a juror; but ... those strong and
deep impressions which will close
the mind against the testimony that
may be offered in opposition to
them; which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him.
Julian, 111 P. 2d at 1064-65 (citations
omitted).
Once a juror's impartiality has been put in
doubt, a trial judge must investigate by further
questions to determine if the juror has merely
"light impressions" or impressions which are
"strong and deep" and which will affect the
juror's impartiality. "When comments are
made which facially question a prospective
juror's impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of
discretion may occur unless the challenged
juror is removed by the court or unless the
court or counsel investigates and finds the
inference rebutted." State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d
1123, 1126 (Utah 1989); see also Bishop, 735
P.2dat451.
The dissent concludes that the mere fact
that a juror was the victim of the same crime
for which the defendant is on trial does not
raise an "inference of bias" but merely a
"question of bias." The dissent claims, therefore, that under these circumstances, a trial
judge is not required to probe the juror to
determine whether the potential bias is merely
a "light impression," thus allowing the juror
to remain, or an "impression which is deep
and strong," in which case the court should
remove the juror for cause.
We find no distinction in Utah case law
between a "question of bias" and an
"inference of bias." Furthermore, we find no
good policy reason not to require probing to
clarify any possible prejudice when fundamental rights are at stake. Such narrow line
drawing would only cause confusion for trial
judges. First, judges would be required to
determine if there was a potential for bias.
Next, they would have to determine whether it
fell into the class of a "question of bias"
where minimal investigation was required or
an "inference of bias" where more thorough
questioning was required. A broader and
simpler statement of the rule actually gives
trial judges clearer direction and more latitude
in ferreting out potential bias.
We agree with the dissent that a trial judge
in the first instance conducts voir dire to
probe for potential bias. That is what the trial

37

judge did in the instant case when he asked
the potential jurors if any of them had been a
victim of forgery. This probe did reveal a
"question" or an "inference" of bias on the
part of three potential jurors. Thus, we
believe, contrary to the dissent, that "because
the probing revealed a potential for bias," the
trial judge was required to address the potential bias "through rehabilitative inquiry" until
this "inference" or "question" was rebutted.
This is precisely what the trial judge attempted
to do.
Additionally, we do not understand what
the dissent means by a "per se" inference of
bias and reject any such nomenclature. If "per
se" as used by the dissent means that a potential juror's prior victimization of the same
crime for which the defendant is on trial raises
an inference such that the trial judge must
probe the juror to insure that he or she can
decide the case impartially despite the past
victimization, we do so hold. This rule,
however, is not appropriately categorized as a
"per se" rule as there is no result which automatically follows. If, however, "per se" as
used by the dissent means that a potential
juror's prior victimization creates an inference
such that the juror's removal is mandated, we
clearly reject such a position. We simply find,
as did the trial judge, that the responses of the
potential jurors that they had been victims of
the same crime for which the defendant was
being tried were "comments" which raised a
facial question as to each prospective juror's
impartiality, thus requiring further probing by
the trial judge.
The dissent relies heavily on the recent Utah
Court of Appeals decision in Stare v. Jonas,
793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) for the
proposition that a prospective juror's prior
victimization of the same crime with which the
defendant is charged does not raise an inference of bias. We agree that there is some
troublesome language in Jonas but find its
result consistent with our conclusion in the
instant case. In Jonas, a prospective juror
disclosed during voir dire that she had been
the victim of theft, the offense with which the
defendant had been charged. The Jonas trial
judge correctly asked the juror no less than
ten individual follow-up questions probing
her potential bias and her answers dispelled
any inference of bias. Against this backdrop,
the court of appeals found no reversible error
when the trial court refused to remove her for
cause.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals did
state that the prospective juror's initial comments did not raise an inference of bias such
that the juror should have been excused for
cause. The court based its conclusion,
however, on the juror's responses to the trial
court's many questions. We think the Jonas
analysis confuses the two-part test of Cob&
and reject it to the extent it holds that being a
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

victim of the same crime with which the defendant is charged does not raise an inference
or question of bias such that the court mustjust as the Jonas court did-investigate
further to probe the juror's ability to be fair
and impartial.
B. Investigation Necessary to Probe Potential
Bias
The level of investigation necessary once
voir dire reveals potential juror bias will vary
from case to case and is necessarily dependent
on the juror's responses to the questions
asked. Nevertheless, the exploration should
not be merely pro forma.
When an inference of bias is raised, the
inference is generally not rebutted simply by a
subsequent general statement by the juror that
he or she can be fair and impartial. As the
supreme court has stated, "[a] statement made
by a juror that she intends to be fair and
impartial loses much of its meaning in light of
other testimony and facts which suggest a
bias." Sfafe v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26
(quoting Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536). Accordingly, "[t]he court, not the juror, must determine a juror's qualifications." Stare v. Jones,
734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987) (quoting Brooks
JJ, 631 P.2d at 884).
Utah case law is helpful in determining the
depth of inquiry which has been sufficient to
clarify potential juror bias. In Bailey, 605
P.2d at 771, the defendant was charged with
distribution of a controlled substance. At trial,
the only witness to testify was the undercover
police officer who made the arrest. During
voir dire of the jury panel, prospective jurors
were asked if they would be inclined to give
the testimony of a police officer greater weight
than that of a witness who was not a police
officer. A prospective juror stated, "you can
rely upon their testimony and their background to the utmost .... I would want to stand
behind them a hundred percent." id. at 768.
In response to this facial comment of bias, the
trial court responded by asking only one
question as to the juror's expressed bias.
Being satisfied that the juror could act impartially, the court did not remove the juror for
cause. Id. Ultimately, the defendant was
convicted and appealed. The supreme court
reversed and remanded, noting that the trial
court's minimal investigation and questioning
was insufficient to rebut the inference of bias.
The court stated that "[t)he [trial] Court's one
question was not sufficient to rebut this inference," adding that "the Court had insufficient
evidence on which to base a conclusion that
there was no bias ...." Id.
In Jonas, 793 P.2d at 902, the trial judge asked eleven different questions in establishing the
impartiality of a prospective juror who had been
the victim of a theft, the crime with which the
defendant was charged. Similarly, in Salt Lake
City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App.
ioc-7\ *h*» trial court made "signifi-
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cant efforts" to determine if a potential juror in
a case involving driving under the influence of
alcohol could remain unbiased given the fact
that his wife had been "broadsided by a drunk
driver." Id. at 1282.
The depth of questioning necessary is
further illustrated by a case very similar to the
instant case; Brooks II, 631 P.2d at 878. Brooks
II involved a defendant charged with
burglary for unlawfully entering a basement
apartment with the intent to commit theft.
During voir dire of the jury venire, two prospective jurors stated that they had been
victims of the same or similar crimes. One
juror responded that his home had been burglarized twice. The other juror noted that she
had been the victim of an armed robbery and
assault in her home. Because of the possible
biases created by this prior victimization, the
court asked multiple questions of these two
jurors. Both jurors indicated that they had
strong feelings about their experiences but felt
that they could render a fair and impartial
verdict based on the evidence. Both jurors,
therefore, were retained.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the
jurors had not been rehabilitated by the
court's questioning and should have been
excused for cause. See id.; see also Gotschall,
782 P.2d at 459 (A prospective juror made
statements that evidenced a lack of understanding of the prosecution's burden of proof
and the defendant's right not to take the
stand. The trial judge asked the juror fourteen
questions before determining that he need not
be excused for cause. The supreme court affirmed.); Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1123 (A prospective juror in a second-degree muider trial
expressed strong feelings against the taking of
human life. This juror was asked eleven questions before the court determined that he
could serve impartially. The supreme court
affirmed.); 7 Ju//an, 771 P.2d at 1061
(Prospective juror in a trial involving charges
of sodomy on a child made comments which
facially indicated she was predisposed to
believe the victims' testimony and was thus
incapable of rendering an impartial verdict.
This juror was asked twenty separate questions
before the trial court decided she could act
impartially. On appeal, the supreme court held
that the juror had been rehabilitated.); Tuero,
745 P.2d at 1283 (The wife of a prospective
juror in a case involving driving under the
influence of alcohol had been "broadsided by
a drunk driver." The court made "significant
efforts" to determine that this juror could
remain unbiased. The court of appeals affirmed.); Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965,
967 (Utah Ct. App.) (The defendant in a trial
involving driving under the influence of
alcohol believed that two prospective jurors
were partial. One juror was associated with
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers; the other
juror was a reserve police officer in an adjoi-
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ning city. Before these jurors were impaneled,
they gave "substantial assurances/ by way of
responses to "specific, detailed questioning" by
the court, that they could be fair and impartial. The court of appeals affirmed.), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987).
The dissent contends that the instant case is
analogous to Homsby v. Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), claiming this court in
that case held that one general question to
prospective jurors was sufficient to detect any
bias which would warrant removal for cause.
See id. at 932. We disagree. Homsby did not
focus on the issue of removal of a juror for
cause.
In Homsby, the plaintiff was seeking recovery from the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints ("L.D.S. Church") for
injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he
swerved his motorcycle to avoid colliding with
a church-owned cow on a public highway. At
the time of voir dire, plaintiff proposed
several questions to the trial court regarding
the affiliation of the prospective jurors with
the L.D.S. Church. The trial court rejected
these questions, stating that the religious preferences of the jurors were none of the court's
business. Instead, the court asked one general
question:
Are there any of you who feel that
you would have trouble being an
impartial juror because of feelings
you may have either pro or con
with regard to the L.D.S. Church
that you think might affect your
ability to be a fair and impartial
juror in this case? If so, I'd like
you to raise your hand.
Id. at 931-32.
Hornsby objected to the trial court's action
and subsequently filed an appeal, claiming
that the trial court erred in limiting voir dire
regarding the panel's religious affiliations.
Accordingly, the issue on appeal, as clearly
stated by this court, was whether the trial
court erred in refusing to voir dire members of
the jury panel concerning their affiliation with
the L.D.S. Church such that the defendant
could knowingly exercise his peremptory challenges. We found the court had erred by
limiting voir dire.
The dissent refers to a small portion of dicta
in Hornsby which can be misleading when
taken out of context: "[t]he question asked by
the trial court was sufficient to detect any
actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge
for cause ...." Id. at 932. The dissent,
however, fails to mention the following sentence: "[b]ecause it is not necessary to this
appeal, we do not decide whether the voir dire
was sufficient to reveal circumstances of relationships that would warrant challenges for
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cause....* Id.
Read in its full context, we believe that Hornsby supports our holding today. The trial
judge in Hornsby asked one general question
to the jury panel regarding whether the juror's
affiliation with the L.D.S. Church would
affect the juror's ability to be fair and impartial. This question was designed to detect any
potential bias which would require further
probing. Similarly, the trial judge in the
instant case asked the jurors' if any of them
had been the victim of a crime similar to that
with which the defendant was charged. In Hornsby, no juror responded positively and,
therefore, there was no need to probe further
to investigate this potential bias. In the instant
case, however, three jurors did respond affirmatively. The fact that the Hornsby court was
not required to probe further when no potential bias was detected does not relieve the
trial court in the instant case of its duty to
probe further when potential bias was detected.
We now turn to the sufficiency of the trial
court's questioning in the instant case. Attempting to rebut the potential bias created
when three jurors admitted to being victims of
the same crime for which the defendant was
on trial, the trial judge simply asked:
Those three of you who have responded, recognizing that this is a
different time and place and circumstance, would that experience,
having been the victim of that type
of a crime, affect your ability to be
fair and impartial in this case, that
is, would you be unable to set aside
that experience and hear the evidence in this case and rule on the
evidence based upon what you hear
and the credibility of the witnesses?
If you would not be able to do so, I
want you to raise your hand.
None of the jurors raised his hand, nor were
any allowed to make a verbal response. We
are concerned that the one general question
was not sufficient to rebut the potential bias
raised by juror VanLeeuwen's comment regarding his prior victimization in light of the
fact that the court posed this question only to
the group of prospective jurors who had been
victims of similar crimes without probing each
individual juror separately to determine the
effect of the experience on the particular
juror. There was never a personalized dialogue
which would have given VanLeeuwen a chance
to express his latent feelings.
Our concern about juror VanLeeuwen is
further compounded by the fact that the trial
judge initially agreed to remove all three prospective jurors based upon their identical
passive responses on the grounds that they had
been victims of the same crime and, therefore,
could not be impartial. Once a trial judge has
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found that a juror should be removed for
cause, it is highly unusual for this juror to be
reinstated without further voir dire to develop
new facts to support the change of direction.1
The trial judge subsequently reinstated
VanLeeuwen on the panel, explaining his
extraordinary action by stating that VanLeeuwen's experience had occurred in a foreign
country and, therefore, -would not affect his
impartiality. The dissent relies on the second
finding of the trial judge that VanLeeuwen
could serve impartially. We are unpersuaded.
The trial judge's conclusion came immediately
after he had removed VanLeeuwen for cause,
presumably because VanLeeuwen could not be
fair and impartial. Subsequent to VanLeeuwen's removal, the trial judge received no
new information on which to logically base his
conclusion that VanLeeuwen could act as a
fair and impartial juror and thus should be
reinstated.
Additionally, there is no logical basis for
assuming that a victim of an identical crime in
a foreign country will be less biased. In actuality, based on the meager information gathered by the trial court, VanLeeuwen was objectively the most likely of the three previously
victimized jurors to be biased. Juror Hoyt was
the victim of theft and use of his credit card,
not forgery. Additionally, although juror
Tyler was the victim of an identical crime, that
experience occurred thirty years ago in 1961.
The remoteness of the incident suggests less
possibility of current bias. In contrast, VanLeeuwen was the victim of a recent identical
crime involving a substantial dollar amount.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances
involved in this voir dire, we cannot say the
record supports a finding that VanLeeuwen
was a fair and impartial prospective juror.
Contrary to the statement of the dissent, we
do not reverse this case based solely on the
fact that only one question was asked by the
trial judge.9 Our reversal is based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding voir
dire. We are troubled that the three jurors
were not questioned individually and each
allowed to respond verbally. Additionally,
VanLeeuwen's reinstatement was the product
of an irregular procedure in that the trial
judge originally removed VanLeeuwen for
cause and then without further fact-gathering
reversed his decision. Furthermore, we find no
persuasive distinction between VanLeeuwen
and the other two prospective jurors who had
also been victims of similar crimes and who
the trial judge presumably found could not be
fair and impartial as he removed them for
cause. We therefore reverse and remand for a
new trial.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
I CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
•This opinion replaces the opinion of the same
UTAH ADVA

name issued on April 2, 1991. (157 Utah Adv.
Rep. 66)
1. The dissent contends that VanLeeuwen was never
stricken for cause at the sidebar conference. The
official jury list, however, indicates that all three
jurors were initially removed for cause at this conference. On this list, the names of jurors Hoyt,
Tyler and VanLeeuwen are crossed out with the
notation "for cause" written next to all three names.
Subsequently, the notation "foreign country" was
included next to juror VanLeeuwen's name, indicating the judge felt that VanLeeuwen should be
reinstated because his experience occurred in a
foreign country.
The dissent correctly states that since no record
was made of the initial conference, "(wje must rely
... on the subsequent reconstruction of that conference made on the record ...." Contrary to the
dissent's assertion, however, this reconstruction
support's defendant's view. Counsel for defendant
reconstructed the conference as follows:
1 believe at the end of voir dire the
Court gave me an opportunity to—or
the Court asked me if I had any challenges, if I passed the panel for cause,
and 1 said no and approached the bench
and I enumerated three individuals who
I felt should be challenged for cause.
Those individuals were Mr. Mark Hoyt,
Mr. Chris VanLeeuwen, and Mr. James
Tyler, and I believe at that time the
Court did strike the three individuals for
cause. The bases were they were victims
of a similar crime to Mr. Woolley's, the
Defendant in this case.
Shortly thereafter the Court reinstated
Mr. VanLeeuwen indicating that because
the crime had been perpetrated in a
foreign country that that was a significant difference.
Neither the state nor the court objected to this
reconstruction in the record below. Furthermore, the
state does not assert a contrary view of the events in
its brief on appeal.
The dissent correctly notes that subsequently, the
court did state that it "determined based on
[VanLeeuwen's] responses, not to strike him." This
language, however, is taken out of context as it
refers not to the court's initial decision to remove
VanLeeuwen but only to the court's subsequent
final decision to leave VanLeeuwen on the panel.
2. Previously, Utah courts have used different phraseology in defining the discretion afforded a trial
judge in dismissing a juror for cause See, e.g.,
Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 459 (motions to dismiss
prospective jurors are within the sound discretion of
the trial court); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah
1984) (in reviewing jury selection, some deference
must be accorded the discretion of the trial court);
State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983) (the
question of the partiality of prospective jurors
remains largely within the discretion of the trial
court); Jenkins v. Parish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981)
(applying the "some deference" standard); State v.
Dixon, 560 P.2d 318 (Utah 1977) (matteir of possible
bias or prejudice of jurors rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court); State v. Jonas, 793
P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.denied, __P.2d__
(Utah 1990) (citing Gotschall as the appropriate
REPORTS
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standard of review); State V. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934 9. The dissent faults defense counsel for not asking
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Gotschall as the appr- for further questions to probe the potential bias of
opriate standard of review). We do not believe, the three jurors, claiming that this failure constithowever, the different wording has actually affected uted a waiver of defendant's right to complain on
the extent of deference afforded on appeal.
appeal. This criticism ignores the fact that after the
3. Although the Jenkins court applied a "some judge's questioning, counsel moved to remove all
deference" standard rather than the "sound discre- three jurors for cause. This motion was granted
tion" standard, regardless of the standard applied, and, therefore, there was no logical reason for
the judge's exercise of discretion must be viewed in counsel to encourage the court to probe further at
light of this factor.
that time.
4. See, e.g., State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah
1989) (holding that defendant was entitled to new BENCH, Judge (dissenting):
trial where prosecutor struck Hispanic juror to get
The majority concludes that the trial court
even with defense counsel who had insisted that
Hispanics be included on the panel); State v. Pike, abused its discretion because it did not make
712 P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 1988) (discussing rati- adequate inquiry. Either the majority is reqonale for presumption of prejudice where improper uiring rehabilitative-like inquiry in all cases
contact between jurors and witnesses or court pers- where there is only a question of potential
onnel occurs).
bias, or it is holding for the first time that
5. The dissent notes that in 1988, the United States
there
is a per se inference of bias that must be
Supreme Court held in JROSS v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
rebutted
whenever a prospective juror has
81 (1988) that as long as the jury which actually sat
for the case was impartial, it is unimportant that previously been a victim of a similar crime.
defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge Both approaches are a departure from our
to excuse a prospective juror. The dissent then states established case law. I believe the trial court
that if we find that VanLeeuwen should have been conducted adequate inquiry once the question
removed for cause, we must reevaluate the Hewitt of potential bias arose because there was no
line of cases in light of Ross.
inference of bias or actual bias evidenced by
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this prospective juror VanLeeuwen's comments.
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian after Ross Further, I believe that the defendant waived
was decided. We assume that the court considered Ross when deciding Gotschall and Julian, but any objection to the extent or manner of voir
chose to stay with its long-standing rule that "[a) dire conducted and has therefore not preserved
court commits prejudicial error if it forces a party that issue for appeal; alternatively, defendant
to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a has not satisfied his burden on appeal to
prospective juror who should have been removed for demonstrate that VanLeeuwen could not have
cause." Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; see also Julian, been impartial.
771 P.2d at 1064 n.ll. Accordingly, we assume this
is still the law in Utah.
DEGREES OF "BIAS"
6. This test was summarized in Cobb when the Utah
There are three degrees of "bias" that may
Supreme Court stated that "(wjhen comments are surface during voir dire: a question of potenmade which facially question a prospective juror's tial bias, an inference of bias, and actual bias.
impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion may The extent of inquiry to be conducted by a
occur unless the challenged juror is removed by the trial court depends on which degree of bias
court or unless the court or counsel investigates and
finds the inference rebutted." Cobb, 114 P.2d at surfaces. If a prospective juror has previously
been the victim of a similar crime, there is a
1126.
7. The dissent cites Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1123, as a legitimate question as to whether that expericase in which the circumstances are "similar" to ence has caused the prospective juror to
those of the instant case. The juror in Cobb referred become biased. When such a question arises,
to by the dissent disclosed during voir dire that she the trial court must probe to determine
had known the prosecutor 15 years earlier when he whether the prospective juror is, in fact,
was a senior in high school. In comparing Cobb to impartial in spite of the past experience.
the instant case, however, the dissent fails to ackn- Typically this is accomplished by the trial
owledge several important distinguishing facts. First, court simply asking if the juror can be impaunlike our case, the juror was individually questioned and asked to explain the relationship and rtial. See, e.g., State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902
whether it would affect her impartiality. Further- (Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232
more, the use of the language that the relationship (Utah 1990); Hornsby v. Corporation of the
"was not that which would warrant an inference of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
bias" is taken out of context as it comes in light of Christ of Latter-day Saints, 758 P.2d 929,
her answers to the questions probing her potential 932 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). If after probing the
bias. Additionally, the Cobb court did not engage in prospective juror's state of mind the trial
the extraordinary practice of initially dismissing a court is satisfied that the prospective juror is
juror for cause and then inexplicably reinstating him nevertheless impartial, that is the end of the
as did the trial court in the instant case.
inquiry.
8. The initial removal of the three challenged jurors
If, on the other hand, the prospective juror,
and subsequent reinstatement of juror VanLeeuwen
took place during a sidebar conference outside the in response to such probing, makes comments
presence of the court reporter. Consequently, no that "facially question a prospective juror's
record of this conference was made.
partiality or prejudice," the court will infer
UTAH ADVANC
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bias as a matter of law. Sfafe v. Cobb, 774
P.2d 1123, 1126-28 (Utah 1989). Once an
inference of bias occurs because of comments
made by the prospective juror, the trial court
must either remove the prospective juror or
rebut the inference with further inquiry. Id. at
1126. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765,
768 (Utah 1980) (trial court failed to remove
or inquire further of prospective juror who
stated that he would give greater weight to
testimony of peace officer). An inference of
bias is rebutted when the rehabilitative inquiry
shows that a prospective juror is "willing to
keep an open mind and apply the law as the
court instruct(s]/' Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1127.
Questions of bias and inferences of bias are
not to be confused with actual bias as evidenced by a prospective juror's "attitude of
bias" or "strong feelings" that indicate the
prospective juror has a closed mind. Once
such strong feelings are revealed, a prospective
juror may not sit, even if the prospective juror
later asserts that he or she can render an
impartial verdict. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d
473, 475 (Utah 1987) (prospective jurors knew
the murder victim's family and expressed
strong feelings of bias); State v. Brooks, 631
P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (prior victims of
crime expressed strong feelings of anger and
frustration about their victimization); Srafe v.
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26-27 (Utah 1989)
(prospective juror had strong and deep impressions and would not indicate that he could
be impartial). Obviously, if a prospective
juror's comments indicate that he or she has a
closed mind then he or she must be removed
for cause and no amount of inquiry will be
sufficient to rehabilitate. Jones, 734 P.2d at
475. Although no claim is made that VanLeeuwen was in fact biased, the majority nevertheless erroneously seeks to apply the actual
bias analysis to the present case.
The majority opinion falters because it fails
to recognize the differences between a
"question of potential bias" that arises because
of a fact situation, an "inference of bias" that
arises because of a prospective juror's comments, and "actual bias" that arises when a
juror reveals strong and deep impressions of
bias. A prospective juror who is found to be
impartial following the general probing that
occurs when a question of potential bias arises
clearly does not need to go through rehabilitative inquiry in order to ensure that he or she
will act impartially.
The fact that a prospective juror was previously a victim of a similar crime raises a question about potential bias which requires
general probing into the prospective juror's
state of mind in light of that experience.
However, unless the prospective juror makes
comments that facially bring into question his
or her impartiality, there is no inference of
bias raised, see, e.g., Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 2526, nor is there actual bias shown, see, e.g.,
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Jones, 734 P.2d at 475. The trial court must
find any inference of bias, or determine that
actual bias exists, "based upon the juror's expressed feelings, attitudes, and opinions."
Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884 (emphasis added).
Because the trial court did not find an inference of bias in this case, there was obviously
no need for it to conduct further inquiry to
rebut such an inference.
In State v. Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126, a prospective juror indicated that she was acquainted with the prosecutor. The revelation of
this fact raised a question of potential bias
that required additional probing. The probing
revealed that she had known him fifteen years
earlier when he was a senior in high school.
He had been friends with her daughter and the
two families had belonged to the same church
group. When asked if her association with the
prosecutor would have caused her to be
swayed to his side, she responded that it
would not. The supreme court held that the
trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss
the prospective juror' for cause because the
prospective juror's answers revealed that her
acquaintance with the prosecutor "was not the
type of relationship that would warrant an inference of bias." Id. (emphasis added).
In the present case, the trial court asked the
prospective jurors to raise a hand if they could
not try the case based only on the evidence
they heard. No hands were raised. The trial
court also asked the panel members to raise a
hand if there were any reasons they could not
be impartial in deciding defendant's guilt or
innocence. None of the jurors did. The trial
court then questioned whether the jurors, if
placed in the position of either the defendant
or the State, would be satisfied by being tried
by a juror of the panel member's frame of
mind or attitude toward the case. Once again,
none of the jurors gave any response indicating potential bias.
After the trial court had concluded its own
voir dire, it invited counsel to ask their own
questions, directed through the court. Defense
counsel requested that the prospective jurors
be asked if they had ever been victims of
crimes similar to that of which the defendant
was accused. Three answered in the affirmative. The experiences of each prospective juror
were briefly related. The trial court then asked
all three prior victims whether they could set
aside their prior experiences and act in a fair
and impartial manner.
Those three of you who have
responded, recognizing that this is a
different time and place and circumstance, would that experience,
having been the victim of that type
of a crime, affect your ability to be
fair and impartial in this case, that
is, would you be unable to set aside
that experience and hear the evid-
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ence in this case and rule on the
evidence based upon what you hear
and the credibility of the witnesses?
If you would not be able to do so, I
want you to raise your hand.
(Emphasis added.)
None of those questioned raised a hand.
The only fault the majority finds in this case
is that the trial court did not ask enough
questions before concluding that VanLeeuwen
was impartial.1 Once the trial court is satisfied
that a prospective juror is impartial, however,
there is no reason for it to continue with
unnecessary questioning. The scope of the
inquiry, is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court because only the trial court knows
when it is satisfied that the prospective jurors
are impartial. See Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. See
also State v. Gotshall, 782 P.2d 459, 462
(Utah 1989); Jonas, 793 P.2d at 906.* The
determination of whether or not a prospective
juror is impartial is a factual determination
made from the "advantaged position" of the
trial court to determine "which persons would
be fair and impartial jurors." Jenkins v.
Parhsh, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981). The
majority therefore faults the procedure used
by the trial court in reaching its factual
finding. I, on the other hand, believe the
inquiry was procedurally sufficient.
The single question asked by the trial court
once it had heard the experiences of the three
prior victims is similar to that asked in Hornsby,
758 P.2d 902, wherein the trial court
inquired:
Are there any of you who feel that
you would have trouble being an
impartial juror because of feelings
you may have either pro or con
with regard to the L.D.S. Church
that you think might affect your
ability to be a fair and impartial
juror in this easel If so, I'd like
you to raise your hand.
Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
As in the present case, none of the prospective jurors raised a hand. We recognized in
Hornsby that one of the purposes of voir dire
is the "detection of bias sufficient to challenge
for cause." Id. at 932. We then held that "the
question asked by the trial court was sufficient
to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant
a challenge for cause under subsection (6) [of
Rule 47(0, Utah R. Civ. P.]." Id. (emphasis
added).3 The majority asserts that one question was not sufficient and relies upon Bailey,
605 P.2d 768 and Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884.
Bailey and Brooks, however, apply only when
there is a strong inference of bias, and that is
not the case before us.
The question asked in the present case
cannot be distinguished from that asked in
Hornsby. The majority fails to show any
defect at all in the question asked.4 Nor does
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it put forth any additional questions that
should have been asked.5 Instead, it relies only
upon the total number of questions asked in
the cases that it cites as support without any
analysis of the substance of those questions.*
An examination of many of those cases reveals
that the higher number of questions resulted
not from rehabilitative questioning, but from
the prospective jurors giving equivocal answers
when asked if they could be impartial.7
In the present case, the prospective jurors'
answers were unequivocal and therefore did
not require any additional inquiry. Absent
some explanation as to why the inquiry conducted by the trial court was insufficient, we
may not say that the trial court abused its
discretion in not inquiring further. We certainly may not declare the trial court's finding
to be clearly erroneous simply because it did
not first ask a magical number of questions.
Another distinction that should be drawn
between the present case and the cases relied
upon by the majority is that in many of those
cases counsel, not the trial court, conducted
the extended inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Julian,
111 P.2d 1061, 1065-66 (Utah 1989) (defense
counsel asked the twenty questions referred to
by the majority, not the trial court). Rule
18(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides counsel an opportunity to ask additional questions with leave of the trial court.
Defense counsel in the present case requested
the question regarding prior victimization, but
did not request any additional probing once
the victimization question and the trial court's
follow-up question regarding impartiality
were asked. Defendant's failure to object to
the extent of the voir dire conducted by the
trial court "constitutes a waiver and bars
inquiry into the bias question." State v.
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988)
(defendant's evidence of juror bias discovered
post-trial was properly refused by trial court
in motion for new trial when "quite foreseeable" issue of potential bias was not raised by
defendant during voir dire). See also State v.
Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983) (trial
court failed to inquire of jurors whether there
would be prejudice in their minds because the
case involved a motorcycle club; defense
counsel's failure to object, to remind the
judge of the oversight, to make a new request,
or to ask personally to voir dire the jury,
effectively waived the error). Defendant has
therefore not preserved the issue for appeal.*
See Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff waived any objection
at trial when it did not attempt to call the
court's attention to a specific question it
desired the court to ask on voir dire and
thereby did not preserve the issue for appeal).
Even if defendant had preserved the issue
for appeal, he failed to meet his burden of
proof on appeal. "Defendant did not demonstrate on the trial record, or on appeal, that
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[the prospective juror] could not act in a fair
and impartial manner."' Layton City v.
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (citing Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884). See also
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108
S.Ct. 2273, 2277 (1988) (defendant "failed to
establish that the jury was not impartiar).
Nor has defendant demonstrated that he was
not "afforded an adequate opportunity to gain
the information necessary to evaluate" VanLeeuwen. Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. "The
trial court abuses its discretion when,
'considering the totality of the questioning,
counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to
evaluate jurors.'" Id. (quoting Bishop, 753
P.2d at 448). Defendant has simply failed to
show how VanLeeuwen was partial, or how he
was prevented in any way from gaining sufficient information about VanLeeuwen to know
whether he was partial.
The majority cannot say that the trial court
did not conduct adequate inquiry simply
because it might have conducted more. Once
the trial court was satisfied that the prospective jurors were impartial, it did not need to
probe any further. If defense counsel was not
satisfied that the prior victims were impartial,
then it should have requested additional
probing.9 The trial court therefore did not
abuse its discretion in asking only one question when the question asked was "sufficient
to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant
a challenge for cause." Hornsby, 758 P.2d at
932 (emphasis added).
PER SE INFERENCE OF BIAS
Since VanLeeuwen made no comments to
call into question his impartiality, no inference
of bias was raised under our traditional analysis. Bias is only inferred when the "comments"
of the prospective juror raise a facial question as to the prospective juror's partiality.
Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126 (emphasis added). Accord Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-26 (fact that
prospective juror had prior involvement in
drug abuse and distribution investigations did
not create an inference of bias where no
comments were made to call into question his
impartiality).10 The majority's ruling expressly
requires trial courts to rebut an inference of
bias whenever the court learns of prior victimization. The majority's ruling therefore
creates a per se inference of bias that attaches
automatically whenever a prospective juror is
a prior victim of a similar crime. The majority
fails to provide any legal or public policy
support for such a ruling. The majority's
approach, in fact, is contrary to our case law."
A recent decision from this court indicates
that prior victimization of a similar crime does
not, per se, raise an inference of bias. In State
v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.) cert,
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), a prospe-
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ctive juror revealed during voir dire that she
had recently been the victim of a theft involving approximately $13,000 worth of tools.
When asked whether the previous theft would
affect her impartiality, the prospective juror
answered, "If it was tools, I might be a little
influenced." Id. at 906. She equivocated
further by admitting that it was "a little hard
to say" whether the prior incident would affect
her ability to be impartial, but eventually
affirmed her ability to remain impartial upon
further questioning by the trial court. Id. This
court held that no inference of bias was
demonstrated by the voir dire questioning
because, although the prospective juror expressed some equivocation, she ultimately manifested her ability to be impartial. Id. at 907.
This court reasoned that since the case did not
involve tools, "it could be inferred that the
prior experience would not influence her at
all." Id. Such reasoning reveals that prior
victimization does not automatically raise a
per se inference of bias that must be rebutted.
See State v. Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 589 P.2d 5,
13-14 (1978); State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55,
402 A.2d 203,207 (1979).
The majority summarily assumes, however,
as a matter of law and in a technical fashion,
that all prior victims are not indifferent to the
case before them. "'Impartiality* is not a
technical conception but is a state of mind; it
is a mental attitude of appropriate indifference." State v. Brooks, 565 P.2d 799, 801
(Utah 1977). If the prior victimization of the
prospective juror in Jonas did not prevent her
from being indifferent, then there is no reason
to assume that VanLeeuwen's prior victimization prevented him from being indifferent. In
general, prospective jurors who affirm their
impartiality are presumed to be impartial
unless proven otherwise. See State v. Dixon,
560 P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1977) (when prospective jurors "gave their word that they had no
such bias or prejudice but could act as fair
jurors[,J [i]t is to be assumed that they were
not swearing falsely and that they believed
they could act as conscientious arbiters in the
case.").
Victimization of minor crimes is an unfortunate part of living in today's society. I do
not believe that the risk of universal bias
among prior victims is so great that it warrants a per se inference of bias that must automatically be rebutted in each and every case.
In a great majority of the cases, a general
probing, such as the probing conducted by the
trial court in this case, will be sufficient to
reveal those prior victims who might not be
impartial. The majority's ruling will therefore
create a significant burden upon our trial
courts without creating any real benefit.
CONCLUSION
1 respectfully dissent from the majority's
holding because it requires prospective jurors
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to be rehabilitated before any inference of bias Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 931.
has even been established. I view the trial 2. Contrary to the majority's assertion in its second
court's decision to have been a factual deter- footnote, there is a real distinction between the
mination that VanLeeuwen was impartial and phraseology used in expressing the appropriate statherefore was capable of sitting on the jury ndard of review. If a matter is within the "sound
discretion" of a trial court, then the appellate courts
without any rehabilitative inquiry. Inasmuch will give maximum deference to the trial court's
as VanLeeuwen said nothing that would faci- determination. The granting of only "some deferally challenge his impartiality, we should give ence" is obviously a more searching review. The
the trial court's factual determination the majority claims to be giving maximum deference
when in fact it is granting only "some deference," if
deference it deserves.
The majority asserts that the approach rec- that much, to the trial court's determination of the
ognized in this dissent would be difficult to appropriate scope of voir dire. Inasmuch as Gotscadminister. Let me summarize the approach in hall is the most recent Utah Supreme Court case, I
believe that the "sound discretion" standard enuncits simplest terms. When facts raise a question
iated therein governs our review in this case and that
of whether a prospective juror may be biased, the majority's departure therefrom is error.
the trial court must probe until it is satisfied 3. The majority erroneously describes this statement
that the prospective juror is in fact impartial. as dicta. At issue in Hornsby was whether the voir
If a prospective juror makes comments that dire was sufficient with regards to the prospective
show he or she is probably biased, then the jurors' feelings toward the L.D.S. Church. Voir
trial court must ask questions to rebut that dire has two functions, "the detection of bias suffiinference. If a prospective juror makes com- cient to challenge for cause," and "the collection of
ments that reveal strong and deep impressions data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory
challenge." State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah
of bias, no rehabilitative inquiry is needed- 1983). In Hornsby, we first reviewed the detection
that juror must be removed. I believe this of bias issue and found that the single question was
approach is much simpler and gives more sufficient to detect bias for purposes of subsection
guidance to our trial courts than simply saying (6) of Rule 47(Q. We did not consider "whether the
that the amount of inquiry needed will vary voir dire was sufficient to reveal circumstances or
from case to case and in this case it just relationships that would warrant challenges for
cause under other subsections of Rule 47(0,"
simply was not enough.
I also believe that this issue was not prop- because that issue was not necessary to the appeal.
Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added).
erly preserved for appeal and that, even if it
Instead, we reversed the case because the voir dire
was, defendant has failed to meet his burden was insufficient to permit the plaintiff an opportuof showing that VanLeeuwen could not have nity to collect data for the informed use of the
acted in a fair and impartial manner or that he peremptory challenge. The majority's partial quote
was prevented from obtaining enough infor- is therefore misleading because it implies that we did
not make any decision relating to challenges for
mation to make that determination.12
cause, when in fact we expressly made such a ruling
I would therefore affirm.
under subsection (6).
Russell W. Bench, Judge
4. The majority attempts to distinguish Hornsby by
pointing out that there were no affirmative respo1. The majority claims that the record does not nses to the general question asked in Hornsby while
support a finding that VanLeeuwen was a fair and there were positive responses in the present case.
impartial juror. The burden of challenging this The majority's analysis, however, ignores the fact
factual finding, however, has not been met by def- that the ultimate issue of impartiality addressed by
endant. "In the absence of a record or transcript one question in Hornsby was addressed by two
supporting defendant's factual contentions on questions in this case. The Hornsby court asked if
appeal, and upon defendant's failure to marshal the prospective jurors had any feelings toward the
evidence that shows the ruling to be clearly erron- L.D.S. Church that would prevent them from being
eous, we presume that the ruling is adequately sup- impartial. If the Hornsby court had broken this
ported by the clear weight of the evidence." State v. question into two parts and first asked, "does any
Christoffcrson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. prospective juror have feelings towards the L.D.S.
1990) (citations omitted).
Church," it probably would have received affirmaEven if the defendant were to marshal the evid- tive responses. Conversely, had the trial court in the
ence in support of the trial court's finding- present case asked the single question, "have any of
which includes the four affirmative, unequivocal you been the victim of a similar crime that would
responses by VanLeeuwen that he could be impartial- prevent you from being impartial," it would not
-there is no evidence of bias on the record to show have received any affirmative responses. The interthat the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. mediate positive response, that the majority claims
The majority is therefore left to attack the proce- distinguishes this case from Hornsby, simply is not
dure used by the trial court in order to show any determinative because the ultimate response was the
abuse of discretion. In addition to its concerns same-the prospective jurors would be impartial.
about the extent of the inquiry, the majority indic- 5. The trial court had already asked three different
ates that it is bothered by the fact there was no questions designed to elicit any bias before the issue
individualized questioning of the three prospective of prior victimization even arose in this case. Inasjurors, but it offers no precedent or analysis to much as we must look at the "totality" of the voir
support its assertion that individualized questioning dire in order to determine whether a trial court has
is required. In the past, this court has accepted abused its discretion, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
collective questioning without comment. See, e.g.,
448 (Utah 1988), the majority errs in not considering
Provo, Utah
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the impact of these previous questions as well.
It's a little hard to say.
When the totality of the voir dire is considered, it is
THE COURT: Well, you just take
clear that the three questions initially asked by the
time to think it over because w e trial court, plus the question following the discovery
you're the one thatof the prior victimization, were "sufficient to detect
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
any actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge for
It probably would, yes.
cause." Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932.
THE COURT: Let's see. You're Mrs.6. In general, the types of questions fall into three
groups: (1) factual questions regarding the prospePROSPECTIVE JUROR D . SMITH:
ctive juror's experiences; (2) questions probing the
Smith, Donna Smith.
prospective juror's self-perceived state of mind
THE COURT: You don't believe that
and whether those experiences would affect his or
you could set those facts aside and make
her ability to act impartially; and (3) questions reba determination on the evidence that's
utting inferences of bias by inquiring whether the
presented in this case?
prospective juror understands his or her role and is
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
willing to be impartial. The majority fails to consI-well, yes, I believe I could be
ider whether the questions asked in the cases cited
impartial.
are factual, probing, or rehabilitative. Absent such
Jonas, 793 P.2d at 905-06.
analysis, the cases cited are useless in determining
8. Contrary to the majority's assertion that the
whether the trial court abused its discretion in the
motion to strike was granted as to all three prior
present case.
victims, and therefore defense counsel did not need
7. The following voir dire colloquy between the trial
to ask for further probing to preserve the issue, the
court and a prospective juror in Jonas is a prime
record reveals that Hoyt and Tyler were removed,
example of extended inquiry due to equivocal
but that VanLeeuwen was never removed.
answers.
No record was made of the actual sidebar conference at which time defendant claims VanLeeuwen
THE COURT: All right. I almost hate
was removed and reinstated, but the conference was
to ask this question, but I'm obligated
later reconstructed on the record. We must therefore
to. Have any of you been the victims of
rely upon the subsequent reconstruction of that
a theft? And that, as I've indicated to
conference made on the record. State v. Suarez, 793
you before what a theft really is, taking
P.2d 934, 936 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)) Defense
property of another with intent to percounsel rehearsed how it had made a motion to
manently deprive them, or in receiving.
remove Hoyt, Tyler and VanLeeuwen and then
Well, we'll take that first. I saw some
stated: "I believe at that time the Court did strike
hands go up in the jury box ....
the three individuals for cause .... Shortly thereafter
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
the Court reinstated Mr. VanLeeuwen ...." The trial
Yes, my husband had about SI3,000
court stated that it was the court's view at the
worth of tools stolen about a year and a
sidebar conference that all three prospective jurors
half ago which we have nevercould be fair and impartial and that the state's
THE COURT: Did a criminal act
objection to striking VanLeeuwen was particularly
result from that-or action?
well taken because his experience occurred in a
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
foreign country. The trial court then indicated that
No, it was reported to the police, which
at sidebar it "determined based on his resj>onses not
they didn't do anything about, and we
to strike him." (Emphasis added). Defence counsel
still have never gotten—
did not make any protest to the trial court's asserTHE COURT: They didn't find it?
tion that it did not strike VanLeeuwen.
PROSPECTIVE JVROR D. SMITH:
Defense counsel's statement that VanLeeuwen
(shook head from side to side)
was stricken and latei reinstated is without any
THE COURT: How long ago was
support in the transcript and is directly contrary to
that?
the trial court's express declaration that it did not
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
strike VanLeeuwen. Defense counsel therefore did
About a year and a half ago.
not preserve the issues of insufficient inquiry or the
THE COURT: Keeping that incident
alleged irregular "reinstatement" of VanLeeuwen.
in mind, as I indicated, there are diffeSee id. The only issue properly preserved for appeal
rent parties involved, but sometimes
is the question of whether VanLeeuwen should have
based on our experience we allow that to
been dismissed for cause based on the answers given.
interfere with our thinking.
9. Had defendant so requested, additional questions
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
could have been posed to the three prospective
It might be. If it was tools, I might be a
jurors after defendant made its request to strike for
little influenced.
cause and before the trial court ruled on the motion.
THE COURT: Well, wait just a
See, e.g., Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; Sah Lake City
minute. Let me ask the questions and
v. Tuero, 758 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah Ct. App.
you just answer the question.
1987).
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
10. The majority misconstrues "comments" as
All right.
meaning VanLeeuwen's statement that he was a
THE COURT: Bearing that in mind,
prior victim. Such an interpretation is clearly not
do you believe that that incident would
consistent with the analysis of Brooks. "Whenever
make it difficult for you to be fair and
the voir dire evokes a strong emotional response,
impartial, particularly to this Defendant,
there is posed a warning that the juror may not have
a well as the people of the state of
the appropriate indifference to the parly or cause
Utah?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
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before the court/* Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884
(emphasis added). VanLeeuwen's response in this
case obviously was not a "strong emotional response."
The majority also misconstrues the language of
Cobb by asserting that the inference that arises from
prior victimization must be rebutted, but that the
prospective juror need not necessarily be removed.
Such an approach is a clear departure from Cobb,
which requires the prospective juror to be removed
if an inference of bias is not rebutted. Cobb, 774
P.2datI126.
11. The majority's approach is also contrary to our
established rules of procedure. Fact situations that
raise a concern serious enough to create a per se
inference of bias are enumerated in rule 18(e) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prior victimization is not one of those per se grounds. Rule
18(e)(4), for example, provides that the following
fact situations automatically constitute grounds for
removing a prospective juror:
the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship
between the prospective juror and any
party, witness or person alleged to have
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable
minds that the prospective juror would
be unable or unwilling to return a
verdict which would be free of favoritism.
12. The majority fails to adequately address an alternative basis for affirmance that has been properly
raised and is before us. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC
Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988). VanLeeuwen did not sit as a juror, but was removed on
a peremptory challenge by defendant. The law in
this jurisdiction has historically been that it is prejudicial error for the trial court "to compel a party
to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a juror
who should have been removed for cause." Hewitt,
689 P.2d at 25. The State urges that if this court
finds that VanLeeuwen should have been removed
for cause, as the majority does, then we must reevaluate the Hewitt line of cases in light of the recent
case of Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct.
2273 (1988). The United States Supreme Court held
therein that where a juror who should have been
excused for cause was removed by defendant's
peremptory challenge, "[a]ny claim that the jury was
not impartial was required to focus, not on [the
excused juror J, but on the jurors who ultimately
sat." 108 S.Ct. at 2277. The Supreme Court reasoned that as long as the jury which actually sat for
the case was impartial, it was unimportant that
defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge
to excuse a prospective juror. 108 S.Ct. at 2278
(citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 436, 7 S.Ct.
614,616(1887)).
In view of the majority's reversal, this alternative
argument deserves discussion. The majority erroneously "assumes" that this issue has been considered
by the Utah Supreme Court since it has decided two
juror removal cases subsequent to the Ross decision
being issued by the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as
appellate courts are limited to the issues properly
raised on appeal, the majority's assumption is unfounded. Since the Utah Supreme Court has never
addressed this issue directly, the majority's ruling

.
places it squarely before us now.
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